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Matthew Garrett
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- 1: Playing with Thunderbolt under Linux on Apple hardware
- 2: A short introduction to TPMs
- 3: More in the series of bizarre UEFI bugs
- 4: Samsung laptop bug is not Linux specific
- 5: Rebooting
- 6: Update on leaked UEFI signing keys - probably no significant risk
- 7: Leaked UEFI signing keys
- 8: Secure Boot and Restricted Boot.
- 9: The current state of UEFI and Linux
- 10: Using pstore to debug awkward kernel crashes
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firmware/hardware-level password protection as an alternative
Date: 2012-06-06 09:00 pm (UTC)I wouldn't be surprised if this is not possible on today's systems, but wouldn't this be an appealing alternative to placing the burden of security on some other key-signing authority? The computer would come with a pre-set random password, and/or ask for one on first boot. Ideally, users could be given the option of using the password, or using Microsoft keys.
I'm curious if you can spot any problems with this idea. One that I see is that the password check may need to be at the cpu, chipset, or firmware level before giving write access to firmware. That might be tricky to implement and/or depend on AMD/Intel wanting to implement it.
Another catch is: if flashing is done within a booted OS, then you face the problem of keyloggers. But this can be avoided by booting from a usb stick to flash the firmware.
I think having this choice is preferable to a "Trust Microsoft's key signing authority and the ability for every signed GNU/Linux distro to lock down their bootloaders, kernels and modules appropriately" approach as the only option besides having no protection at all.
What do you think about this idea?