[personal profile] mjg59
James Bottomley just published a description of the Linux Foundation's Secure Boot plan, which is pretty much as I outlined in the second point here - it's a bootloader that will boot untrusted images as long as a physically present end-user hits a key on every boot, and if a user switches their machine to setup mode it'll enrol the hash of the bootloader in order to avoid prompting again. In other words, it's less useful than shim. Just use shim instead.

Date: 2012-10-11 05:24 pm (UTC)
From: (Anonymous)
Will computers indefinitely let users disable secure boot completely?
From: (Anonymous)
The solution by Linux Foundation allows me to run a VM system, allows me to run any second Linux under the first, and allows me to use the hardware that I have purchased to run what I want. If we really want dual boot, then the bios should have an option at power on time to a) run UEFI security b) run non UEFI mode,
c) Ask me which mode to run

Date: 2012-10-12 03:06 am (UTC)
From: (Anonymous)
Where can I get shim and how do I install it?

Date: 2012-10-12 05:55 pm (UTC)
From: (Anonymous)
I think a "continue, but just this once" mechanism makes sense for a different set of applications than shim does. I don't really want to have shim trust the keys signing rescue CDs and installers on an ongoing basis, but having a "just this once" authorization makes sense. Shim could presumably also do it, but I think it's nicer to have that sort of boot image not have an interface that suggests that you would want to trust it to boot unattended.


Matthew Garrett

About Matthew

Power management, mobile and firmware developer on Linux. Security developer at CoreOS. Member of the Linux Foundation Technical Advisory Board and the Free Software Foundation board of directors. Ex-biologist. @mjg59 on Twitter. Content here should not be interpreted as the opinion of my employer.

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