Yay - self modifying code :). I'd expect the kernel command line to be signed as well, though - it's an obvious attack vector.
Actually, this got me thinking - chunks of the kernel can get paged out to disk (presumably after the signature is verified). Is the signature checked again when the vmm pages it back in? Or could I try writing to /dev/hda to subvert things?
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Re: Signing kexec blobs?
Date: 2013-12-03 11:59 pm (UTC)Actually, this got me thinking - chunks of the kernel can get paged out to disk (presumably after the signature is verified). Is the signature checked again when the vmm pages it back in? Or could I try writing to /dev/hda to subvert things?