You're not making much sense

Date: 2018-04-06 07:20 pm (UTC)
From: (Anonymous)
You're saying: "Distributions would then have to ship an additional kernel that had lockdown disabled (it's not possible to just have a command line argument that disables it, because an attacker could simply pass that), and users would have to disable secure boot to boot that anyway."

If I understand your article, disabling UEFI secure boot automatically disables lockdown mode (and if not, why not?), so why do you need another kernel with lockdown disabled by default to be shipped? And you really think that a user is going to be able to distinguish between two official kernels, both shipped by the distributor? Why would an attacker not force that kernel to be booted when he gets control over the machine?

Having a command line parameter to disable lockdown would make it obvious both in the journald logs or in /proc/cmdline. Part of me thinks though that user friendliness is not your goal here, only providing some fuzzy feelings of "magic" security that can be withdrawn at any time if the user does "naughty" things.
From:
Anonymous
OpenID
Identity URL: 
User
Account name:
Password:
If you don't have an account you can create one now.
Subject:
HTML doesn't work in the subject.

Message:

If you are unable to use this captcha for any reason, please contact us by email at support@dreamwidth.org


 
Notice: This account is set to log the IP addresses of everyone who comments.
Links will be displayed as unclickable URLs to help prevent spam.

Profile

Matthew Garrett

About Matthew

Power management, mobile and firmware developer on Linux. Security developer at Google. Ex-biologist. @mjg59 on Twitter. Content here should not be interpreted as the opinion of my employer.

Expand Cut Tags

No cut tags